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REINFORCING THE IDENTITY OF THE AFRICAN CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
COMMITTEE: A CASE FOR LIMITING THE LUST FOR JUDICIAL POWERS IN
AFRICAN QUASI-JUDICIAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS
SOLOMON T EBOBRAH

Established as a quasi-judicial treaty supervisory body rather than an international court, the African
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child struggles for relevance in the African human
rights system where most non-state stakeholders arguably prefer organs with clear judicial powers. Thus,
similar to the experiences of its older counterparts, the Committee appears to be under subtle pressure to
substitute or at least reinforce its quasi-judicial character with more judicial powers and action. In essence,
the Committee suffers from the uncertainty that prevails in international law regarding the definition of the
term quasi-judicial; and the unclear distinction between quasi-judicial bodies and international courts. This
paper seeks to contribute to addressing that uncertainty within international human rights law by showing
that an important defining distinction between quasi-judicial bodies and international courts is the purpose
for their respective establishment. Accordingly, the paper simultaneously highlights the need to retain the
Committee in its original character and challenges the view that quasi-judicial bodies are established only
because states desire to water-down treaty obligations by creating supervisory bodies that lack power to
challenge violative state action. This paper also argues that quasi-judicial bodies have their own intrinsic
value in promoting the implementation of international human rights standards so that forcing quasi-judicial
bodies to act like international courts defeats the purpose and thus, the value of quasi-judicial bodies.

1. IN ORDER TO ENHANCE its relevance and acceptance as a mechanism for human rights
protection, the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Child Rights
Committee or Committee) appears to be labouring under subtle pressure to alter its identity. The
Committee appears to be caught between acting like the quasi-judicial body (QJB) that it is and
acting like an international court (IC) that it is not. Twenty five years after it was established under
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child1 (African Children Charter), the
Committee remains largely unknown, overshadowed by the more illustrious judicial-acting organs
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of the African human rights system (AHRS). The Committee is generally perceived as an
ineffective organ which has yet to live up to its vast potentials for protecting the rights of children
in Africa.2 In a largely judicialized AHRS in which institutional success is commonly recorded
and measured partly in terms of litigation concluded before continental organs, some of the
criticism arguably relates to the Committee’s on-going struggle with its adjudicatory3 work. Apart
from the less-than-robust reception it receives from non-state actors, the Committee struggles for
attention from African states. The African Union (AU) itself is accused of neglecting the
Committee while state parties are considered to be unwilling to engage with it.4 One effect of such
negative perception and evaluation is that stakeholders put the Committee under pressure to
enhance its relevance by taking on a more judicial character.
Against the background above, this article contends that negative assessment of the
Committee’s work results from the use of an unsuitable evaluation framework, prompted by a
common practice of expecting QJBs to act like ICs. Making a case for the Committee to resist
pressure to imitate ICs, this article contends that when QJBs cave in to such pressure, uncertainty
regarding the distinction between ICs and QJBs is perpetuated. The article argues that definitions
that hold out processes and quality of decisions as the main distinction between QJBs and ICs
reinforce pressure on QJBs to mimic ICs. Accordingly, purpose is proposed as an additional
element to distinguish between QJBs and ICs with potential to reduce pressure and release QJBs
to serve the roles originally envisaged for them by their creators.5 Historical evidence suggests that

2

. See for instance Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012). The limited, though growing NGO activity around the Committee and the dearth of scholarship on the
Committee’s work can be seen as other evidence of dissatisfaction with its work.
3
. Adjudicatory is used loosely to mean decision making in contestation between two parties. As at 2015, the
Committee had received three communications and disposed of two.
4
. Gina Bekker, “The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child” in Manisuli Ssenyonjo,
ed, The African Human Rights System: 30 Years After The African Charter On Human And Peoples Rights
(Leiden/Boston : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012)
5
. The original roles envisaged for QJBs are highlighted infra.
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treaty negotiators and state representatives usually had distinctive expectations of QJBs and of
ICs.6 Thus, QJBs should represent an alternative path to treaty monitoring than is offered by ICs.
This perception of distinction may well be the basis on which states decide whether to endorse the
establishment of any particular treaty supervisory mechanism. States rationally decide whether to
establish an international court or any other institutional design instead of a court.7 Deliberateness
in choice of institutional designs generally presupposes an ‘ability to anticipate the consequences
of particular types of institutions’8 such that function (and therefore, assessment) of an
international body should follow its form.
Notwithstanding the distinctiveness of their design, QJBs are increasingly pressured to
behave like ICs and some have adapted their practices to be more judicial. Facing dissatisfaction
with its work and confronted with comparative references to allegedly more powerful QJBs, the
Committee is encouraged to act like an IC by increasing its own powers. This raises the question
whether the Committee is established and funded to perform the same functions as ICs. Linked to
this is the question whether the quasi-judicial design of the Committee has any real implications
for the Committee’s work and for the rights, duties and expectations of its stakeholders. Put
differently, why do states sometimes establish a QJB instead of an IC if they intend to achieve the
same result?
An impression that emerges from the literature is that treaty negotiators prefer QJBs
because African States hope to avoid effective supervision of their treaty obligations.9 This
understanding of intention to water-down supervision prompts the human rights community’s

6

. The travaux preparatoire of the European Convention on Human Rights is illustrative of this point.
. Also see Dinah Shelton, “Form, Function and the Power of International Courts”, (2009) 9 Chi J Int’l L, 537 at 541.
8
. Lisa Martin & Beth Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions”, (1998) 52 Int’l Org
729 at 749.
9
. Nsongurua Udombana, “Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than Never”, (2000)
3 Yale H R & Dev J 45, illustrates this approach.
7
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claim or sense of duty to beat states at their own game by forcing QJBs, like the Committee, to
transform into de facto ICs. But does insincerity explain the motivation for the design of the
Committee? Do QJBs not have their own intrinsic value in promoting respect for international
human rights norms? Will visualizing the Committee on a template based on the original functions
of QJBs improve popular and scholarly assessment of its work? To answer these questions, a
modest comparative archival research method is employed to extract data from the founding and
working documents of the three regional human rights systems. A legal doctrinal approach is
however employed for analysis of the data.
This article is divided into five main sections, with this introduction as the first section. In
section II, a descriptive analysis of the Committee is presented, highlighting its features but also
showing how purpose distinguishes the Committee as a QJB, from ICs. Drawing on proxy
evidence, Section II also argues that negative assessment triggers pressure on the Committee to
imitate ICs as it searches for relevance in a crowded field. Section III considers whether the design
of the Committee negatively impacts on its potential to protect the human rights of children. Taking
into account the functions of ICs and factors that enhance state socialization in international law,
this section asks whether the judicial features of ICs are more suitable for advancing international
human rights standards. Holding out purpose as an important distinction between QJBs and ICs,
section IV invites the use of a different template for assessing the Committee by reconceptualising
some of the Committee’s functions in a different light. Section V summarizes the main arguments
and conclusions of the paper.

THE IDENTITY OF THE AFRICAN CHILDREN’S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE

2. THIS COMMITTEE IS NOT A COURT!
Generally, QJBs in regional human rights systems are so similar to ICs in form and actual
functioning that it is often difficult to assert that they are different types of bodies.10 Yet, when
States chose the Committee as the supervisory organ of the African Child Rights Charter they
effectively rejected the idea of creating an IC as the treaty’s organ.11 So, what differentiates a QJB
from an IC? Why and how is the Committee an alternative path to implementation of the African
Child Rights Charter? What factor(s) trigger the Committee’s search for a different identity than
it was created with?
The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (i.e. the
Committee) is established in article 32 of the African Child Rights Charter.12 The Committee’s
explicit purpose is ‘to promote and protect the rights and welfare of the child’.13 To achieve its
purpose, the Committee is empowered to collect and document information as well as to
commission inter-disciplinary assessments of problems relating to child rights with the aim of
making recommendations to governments.14 Other functions of the Committee include the
formulation of principles and rules for the protection of children’s rights, cooperating with other
institutions and organisations involved in the promotion and protection of children’s rights,
monitoring the implementation and protection of Charter rights, interpreting the African Children

10

. QJBs in the UN human rights system are somewhat distinct from their regional counterparts in terms of functions,
powers and processes. This article focuses on regional human rights QJBs.
11
. Owing to the dearth of literature on the history of the African Child Right’s Committee, the literature on the African
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (African Commission) is adapted for the analysis. This is because the
Committee is modeled after the African Commission and the Committee’s establishment is motivated by some (if not
all) of the arguments that have been advanced for the establishment of the African Commission.
12
. The Committee which consists of 11 members was formally constituted in 2001.
13
. The inclusion of ‘protection’ as a purpose has been widely been interpreted as indicative of a judicial or at least
juridical function. This article challenges that wisdom.
14
. African Children’s Charter, supra note 1, art 42(a).
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Charter upon request and performing any other duty assigned by the parent organisation.15
However, the Committee’s three outstanding functions are those related to its mandate to receive
periodic reports from state parties,16 receive and consider communications17 and undertake
investigation that the Committee considers appropriate for its work.18
Despite the Committee’s mandate to ‘protect’ and its power to receive and consider
communications – two features relied upon to support the claim of a right to exercise powers of a
judicial nature – there is no evidence that States intended the Committee to function as a court.19
Since its establishment was partly motivated by a desire to improve on the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in terms of utility and efficacy of treaty supervision,
the Committee enjoys more powers than the CRC’s supervisory body. 20 Yet, although both the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) existed as models of human rights courts at the time the African Children Charter was
adopted, African States did not create a court. Instead, despite the criticism that had trailed the
work of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR or African
Commission), the structure, mandate, functions and powers of the Committee were made
significantly similar to those of the ACmHPR leading at least two authoritative commentators to

15

. Ibid.
. Ibid art 42.
17
. Ibid art 44.
18
. Ibid art 45.
19
. Regarding the African Commission, scholars and the Commission argue that the protective mandate revolves
around the communications procedure. See Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, “The Status of the Findings of the African
Commission: From Moral Persuasion to Legal Obligation”, (2004) 48:1 J Afr L 6 -7.
20
See for instance Karin CJM Arts, “The international protection of children’s rights in Africa: The 1990 OAU Charter
on the rights and welfare of the child” (1993) 5 RADIC 155 arguing that the Committee is more progressive and resultoriented.
16
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observe that the Committee ‘resembles’21 or ‘duplicates’ the African Commission.22 This must
mean a rejection of the idea of a court under the African Children Charter since the ACmHPR
itself is the result of a decision not to establish a court. In relation to the Commission, Viljoen
makes this point when he asserts that ‘When the African human rights system was forged ... the
possibility of an African human rights court was raised but rejected’ because of perception that it
was ‘premature to establish a judicial institution’.23 This decision was a deliberate and rational
choice of the States that signed up to the African Charter.24 Thus, by creating the Committee in
similar format, African States effectively indicated their preference for an institution that is not a
court.
Notwithstanding the rejection of the idea of a court, the communications procedure of the
Committee (like that of the ACmHPR) represents authorization to exercise powers of a judicial
nature and is commonly seen as one of the main thrust of the ‘protective’ mandate. Commentators
generally refer to the communications mandate in glowing terms. While some believe it represents
the Committee’s ‘potential to break new grounds’,25 others see it as one of the ‘key elements’ for
enhancing ‘the Committee’s visibility and credibility as a separate body within the African human
rights system’.26 Such perceptions drive a tendency to criticise QJBs that lack powerful
communications procedures. For instance, despite the Committee’s efforts in improving the States

. Frans Viljoen, “Supra-national human rights instruments for the protection of children in Africa: The Convention
on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child” (1998) 31 CILSA 199 at
210. In another work, Viljoen states that the Committee “mirrors” its ‘mother institution the African Commission’.
See Viljoen, supra note 2 at 399.
22
. Curtis FJ Doebbler, “A complex ambiguity: The relationship between the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights and other African Union Initiatives Affecting Respect for Human Rights” (2003) 13 Transnat’l L &
Contemp Probs 7 at15.
23
. Frans Viljoen, “A human rights court for Africa and Africans”, (2004) 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. 1 at 4
24
. Ndombana, supra note 9, 74; Viljoen, supra note 23 at 6.
25
. Amanda Lloyd, “Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African
Committee of Experts: Raising the Gauntlet”, (2002) 2 The Int’l J of Children’s Right 187.
26
. Lorenzo Wiakefield & Usang Assim, “Dawn of a new decade? The 16th and 17th Sessions of the African Committee
of Experts and the Rights and Welfare of the Child”, (2011) 11:2 Afr Hum Rts L J 699 at 706.
21
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reporting procedure, some have opined that ‘the contribution of the Committee to the protection
of human rights of children in Africa has been yet to be fully determined’ because ‘the primary
contribution of the Committee to the protection of human rights … has been through the
examination of state reports’.27 Faced with such challenges to its relevance, the Committee strives
for a more legally powerful communications procedure, making a case that ‘greater use of this
procedure should be encouraged...’28 possibly to enhance its ‘visibility and credibility’.
On its own, emphasis on the communications procedure does not alter the Committee’s
identity even if it could cause a somewhat unhealthy focus on that aspect of the Committee’s work.
However, the pressure that Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and scholars put on QJBs
to strengthen their communications procedures by according their decisions binding legal effect
comparable to decisions of ICs, carries the potential to alter the identity and purpose of the
Committee.29 According to common understanding among NGOs, by so doing QJBs are supposed
to coerce like ICs, instead of working to persuade states. The literature on the early days of the
ACmHPR’s work provides ample proxy example of such pressure. One influential commentator
argued for instance, that the African Commission ‘stands as a toothless bulldog’ which can only
bark but not bite.30 This position is based on the commonly held view that a fundamental weakness
of the communications procedure of QJBs in Africa is that the resulting decisions are
recommendations which are not final31 and are not considered to be legally binding.32 This ‘non-

27

. Doebbler, supra note 22 at 15.
. 2015- 2019 Draft Strategic Plan of Action of the Committee, 7.
29
. In informal interviews with the present author in July 2013, citing the ‘progress’ made by the African Commission,
some stakeholders urged the Committee to take the initiative to be more assertive.
30
. Ndombana, supra note 9 at 64; Rachel Murray & Elizabeth Mottershaw, “Mechanisms for the Implementation of
Decisions of the African Commission on Human Rights” (2014) Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 36:2 349.
31
. Viljoen, supra note 23 at 13; Jeremy Sarkin, “The African Commission and the African Charter: Comparative
lessons from the European Court of Human Rights” (2011) 18 SA J Int’l Aff 281at 284. The African Commission’s
decisions become final when they have been presented to the political organs of the AU in the Commission’s annual
report.
32
. Rachel Murray & Elizabeth Mottershaw, supra note 30 at 351.
28
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binding nature of findings’ and ‘the weak legal basis for remedies’ are seen as the reason why
states would not comply and therefore explains why the impact of the decisions remain low.33
While these analyses appear to aptly capture veritable shortcomings of QJBs, they result from
viewing QJBs with comparative lenses in which ICs are the comparator. They also give the
impression that a human rights supervisory mechanism is only (or at least more) effective when it
has the power to bind states by mere pronouncement. In reaction to such comparison, QJBs such
as the Committee consciously or unconsciously strive to behave like courts despite their quasijudicial character. So what does it mean to say that the African Children’s Committee is a quasijudicial body?
Although the terms are commonly used in international law literature, ‘quasi-judicial’ or
‘quasi-judicial body’ are hardly defined or described.34 As for ICs, Shelton defines a court as ‘both
an independent body that answers legal questions according to principles and rules of law, and the
physical space where judicial proceedings occur’.35 She considers ‘physical space and
proceedings’ as factors that distinguish ‘non-judicial bodies’ from courts.36 Viljoen and Louw
generally identify three features (powers) that distinguish judicial bodies – ‘consideration of
complaints in line with the rules of natural justice’, ‘delivering legally reasoned judgment and the
ordering of remedies’.37 Romano prefers to describe and sets out seven criteria that qualify an
international judicial body or court. For Romano, the body must be permanent, established by an
international instrument, apply international law, decide cases on the basis of rules of procedure

33

. Viljoen, supra note 23 at 14; Sarkin, supra note 31 at 284.
. Historically, the term ‘quasi-judicial’ has earlier usage in Constitutional and Administrative Law where it was
applied to ‘describe certain kinds of powers wielded by ministers or government departments but subject to a degree
of judicial control in the manner of their exercise’. Thus, it may have been used in the context of separation of powers
to refer to ‘functions which lie on the borderland between the judicial and executive spheres’. See HWR Wade, ‘Quasijudicial’ and its background’ (1949) 10 Cambridge L. J 216-240.
35
. Shelton, supra note 7 at 538.
36
. Ibid.
37
. Viljoen & Louw, supra note 19 at 14.
34
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which precede the case in question and cannot be modified by the parties, render decisions that are
legally binding, be manned by permanent independent adjudicators whose appointment precedes
the case(s) and consider cases that involve at least one sovereign state or international
organisation.38 Distinguishing between bodies that use ‘adjudicative means’ and ‘non-adjudicative
means’, Romano argues that the legal quality of decisions effectively distinguishes between ICs
and QJBs.39
By these analyses, the procedure by which complaints are determined and the legal quality
of the resulting decisions are the two main features that distinguish QJBs from ICs. Procedure is
an including feature since a non-judicial-body is termed quasi-judicial in the sense of being ‘likea-court’ only when it adopts complaint-handling-processes characteristic of courts. Quality of
decision is then an excluding feature in the sense that mechanisms without competence to make
legally binding decisions cannot be seen as courts even if they employ judicial procedures. From
this standpoint, the pressure to be ‘more judicial’ invites QJBs to aspire to make their decisions
binding if they are to be taken more seriously. While this is not to suggest that decisions of QJBs
must never be implemented by states in order for those bodies to remain ‘quasi-judicial’, it means
that decisions of QJBs do not bind automatically by mere fact of pronouncement by the body – an
issue regarding the nature of its institutional authority. Rather, such decisions are implemented
when the target states are convinced without the external pressure invoked by the mere binding
legal quality of the order–a function of recognition of the intellectual authority of the body. This
article focuses on the excluding features that contrast these bodies. Hence, what is generally

. Cesare PR Romano, “The proliferation of international judicial bodies: the pieces of the puzzle”, (1999) 31 NYU
J Int’l L & Pol 714 -715; Cesare PR Romano, “A taxonomy of international rule of law institutions”, (2011) 2 J Int’l
Disp Settlement 241, 251 – 256.
39
. Cesare,(1999) supra note 38 at 714. According to him, ‘This last element rules out a large number of compliance
monitoring mechanisms and bodies whose outcome is typically a mere recommendation which is subsequently
scrutinized by a larger political organ’.
38
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considered to be a major flaw in the design of QJBs is in fact one of the main features that
distinguishes them from ICs and attempting to rectify that so-called flaw is tantamount to altering
the identity of the Committee.
The founding instruments of the three regional human rights systems elucidate claims
regarding the key distinctions between QJBs and ICs. Like ICs, regional human rights QJBs are
established by international treaties.40 All three regional QJBs are also composed of independent
experts who enjoy diplomatic immunities equivalent to judges of ICs. Each has authority to receive
petitions from states and non-state actors against states parties, while the African and InterAmerican Commissions are mandated to undertake a range of other activities including to receive
state reports.41 All three QJBs have permanent existence with permanent secretariats even though
their members only work part-time. Each QJB monitors the implementation of international
treaties and principles (substantive law) applying fact-finding and (adversarial) adjudicatory
processes previously established by rules of procedure adopted as international documents. 42 On
these grounds, QJBs share most of the features and processes that define international courts.

40

. Although the European Commission for Human Rights is now defunct, it is used (in the present tense) in this article
for comparative purposes. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights adopted on 27 June 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 ILM 58 1982 entered into force on 21 October 1986[African Charter] and the African
Children’s Charter supra, note 1 are instruments for the African Commission and the Committee respectively. The
European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms No. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 221, XI
[Original ECHR] established the defunct European Commission for Human Rights. The Inter-American Commission
for Human Rights (IACmHR) is far more complicated in terms of founding instruments. At least three instruments
establish and/or state the functioning structure of the IACmHR. It was created by international resolution and the
adoption of its statute as an international instrument by the Organisation of American States. However, the American
Convention of Human Rights [American Convention] and the Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS)
are
also
a
relevant
treaty
for
the
Inter-American
Commission.
See
www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/1.INTRO.Eng.pdf. Also see Fernando Volio, “The Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights”, (1981) 30 Am U L Rev 65.
41
. See African Children’s Charter, supra note 1, art 44; African Charter supra note 40, arts 46-55; American
Convention on Human Rights 26, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. Nº 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art 44 and; Original ECHR,
supra note 40, arts 24-25. The ECmHR was slightly different since beyond acting as a sift, its handling of petitions
was specifically aimed at reaching amicable settlement. In the case of the IACmHR, the communications mandate
was granted in 1965 subsequent to its establishment, to enhance its effectiveness.
42
. Founding treaties empower QJBs to draw up their own rules of procedure. The procedures respect the rules of
natural justice. For eg, African Children’s Charter, supra note 1, art 38; American Convention, supra note 40, art 39.
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Despite these similarities, some distinctions can be identified. In terms of processes, some
(not all) QJBs are required to or generally reserve the discretion to sit in private when they consider
communications.43 Further, QJBs undertake functions akin to those of investigating judges in
certain civil law jurisdictions in the sense that they are more actively involved in fact-finding than
ICs.44 Crucially, unlike the ‘binding’ decisions of ICs, decisions of QJBs are generally considered
as ‘not-binding’ on states.45 This distinction arises partly from the fact that whereas in relation to
ICs there are treaty provisions that require ratifying states to ‘undertake to comply with the
judgment’, no comparable treaty undertaking is usually made in relation to QJBs.46
Consequently, in theory, in the event of non-compliance, a threat of enforcement by
political organs of regimes attaches to judgments of ICs whereas no clear sanction regime attaches
to findings and reports of QJBs.47 Thus, notwithstanding what the QJB considers to be the legal
status of its decisions (its binding quality), those decisions can only be branded as binding when
state parties (as a collective) recognize an obligation to coerce an offending state to comply. From
this perspective, decisions by ICs such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights attributing
binding quality to the decisions of human rights QJBs can be understood as examples of how
. The African Charter, supra note 40, art 59 imposes confidentiality on the ACmHR’s measures until approved by
the AU Assembly. Accordingly, Rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights 2010 adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights during its 2nd ordinary session held
in Dakar (Senegal) from February 2 to 13, 1988 and revised during its 18 th ordinary session held in Praia (CaboVerde) from October 2 to 11, 1995, states that private sessions shall be confidential. Communications are considered
at these private sessions. Similarly African Children’s Charter, supra note 1, art 44 requires communications to be
‘treated in confidence’. The Original ECHR, supra note 40, art 33 required the ECmHR to meet in camera. The
IACmHR Rules of Procedure, art 68 require that body to hold public hearings except exceptional circumstances
require otherwise.
44
. QJBs exercise different degrees of power to investigate.
45
. This is what scholars like Romano consider to be the main distinction between ICs and QJBs. The result of
communications proceedings is not a judgment but generally a report of facts, opinions, conclusions and
recommendations sent to relevant authorities.
46
. In the case of the ECmHR, states undertook to regard as binding decisions of the Committee of Ministers which
considers the ECmHR’s report. See Original ECHR, supra note 40, art 32(4).
47
. Viljoen & Louw, supra note 1 at 3 differentiate between ‘binding’ from an international perspective and from a
national perspective. They argue that from the international perspective, sanctions follow non-compliance
(enforcement) whereas from the national perspective, an obligation to give effect in the domestic system arises
(implementation). It is not clear whether they intend that these two are separate and independent of each other.
43
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international organs cave in to pressure to alter the quasi-judicial identity and character of QJBs.
While this is not to suggest that decisions of QJBs should be ignored, those decisions do not depend
on the enforcement by the collective for their efficacy.
In human rights regimes, the legal quality of decisions does not always guarantee
compliance just as it does not always translate to decisions being ignored by states. For instance,
apart from Nigeria and Botswana that have at some point categorically renounced any obligation
to implement a decision of the African Commission on the grounds that it carried no binding legal
force,48 African states generally either implement decisions of the African Commission or find
excuses for non-implementation other than a denunciation of their binding legal quality.49
Conversely, despite the legally-binding quality of judgments of the ECOWAS Community Court
of Justice, the Gambia has not always complied with judgments delivered by that court against it.50
Notwithstanding these anecdotes, the legally-binding quality of decisions is a major distinction
between QJBs and ICs. Hence, one way to explain compliance with the supposedly non-binding
decisions would be the effort made by the QJBs to act like ICs for instance by producing ‘wellreasoned judicial opinions’.51 Whatever the explanation, the blurring boundaries between the
‘binding decisions’ of ICs and the ‘non-binding decisions’ of QJBs, mostly resulting from the
efforts of the QJBs reduces the value that can be assigned to the legally-binding quality of decision

. Viljoen & Louw supra note 19 reports that this was the approach of Nigeria’s military rulers in a line of case. On
Botswana, see Murray & Mottershaw supra note 31 on the events following Comm 313/05 Good v Botswana before
the African Commission.
49
. From Viljoen & Louw’s approach, this can be explained as a consequence of the African Commission’s insistence
that its decisions are binding, at least from the national perspective of binding. But when it is considered that no
consequence (other than community opprobrium) attaches to non-compliance, it is difficult to link implementation to
the binding status of the decision.
50
. Gambia’s reaction to the decision of the ECOWAS Court in Ebrimah v Gambia, (2008) AHRLR 171 is instructive.
51
. Douglass Cassel, “Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard” in D Shelton ed Commitment and
Compliance: The Role Of Non-Binding Norms In The International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000).
48
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as an excluding feature. It also demonstrates how mimicry enables QJBs to convincingly pretend
to be ICs, thereby amplifying the need to identify additional features to distinguish ICs from QJBs.
One such additional feature that distinguishes between QJBs and ICs has to be the purpose
for the establishment of these bodies. Purpose can be explicit in the listed mandate or implicit in
the overall analysis of functions and outcomes weaved throughout the founding instruments. In all
three regional systems, human rights courts are established specifically to ‘interpret and apply’
relevant human rights instruments.52 Conversely, QJBs are generally established to ‘promote and
protect’ the rights provided for in relevant instruments.53 From the perspective of their ordinary
(dictionary) meanings, two distinct roles are envisaged by the consistent choice and use of these
words. The terms ‘interpretation’ and ‘promotion’ are fairly straightforwardly distinct. However,
the term ‘protect’ appears to be equated with the term ‘application’, leading to the conclusion that
in order to protect effectively, QJBs such as the Committee need to act judicially.54 While
‘application’ means an ‘act of administering’55 or ‘act of making a rule ... operate or become
effective’56, the term ‘protect’ means to ‘make sure that somebody or something is not harmed’57
or ‘to keep something from being harmed’.58

. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights adopted in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on 9 June 1998 and entered into force on 25 January
2004, art 3; original ECHR, supra note 40, art 45 and European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (as amended 2010) art 32; African Charter, supra note 40, art 60.
53
. The African Charter, supra note 40, art 45; African Children’s Charter, supra note 1, Art 42; the African Charter,
supra note 40, art 45 alludes to ‘promote respect for and defense of human rights’. The mandate to ‘ensure the
observance of engagements undertaken … in the … Convention’ in the original ECHR, supra note 40, art 19 relates
to both the ECmHR and the ECtHR. However, while the court’s actual mandate is further outline, the ECmHR has no
other mandate beyond art 19.
54
. See Viljoen and Louw supra note 19 at 7 who argue that the ‘only plausible means’ by which the African
Commission can protect ‘is through findings…
55
.Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed, (Massachusetts: Springfield Press 2003).
56
. Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary, 8th ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)61.
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. Ibid.
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. Merriam-Webster, supra note 55.
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It can be argued that whereas ‘application’ presupposes bringing the consequence of noncompliance to bear within a regime, to ‘protect’ is more akin to the law enforcement role in
domestic system which involves preventive work but may also include the task of setting the
machinery of justice in motion where all else has failed. In other words, whereas the purpose of
ICs is distinctively to apply or cause the sanction regime to apply reactively in the event of breach,
the ‘protective’ purpose of QJBs could be to proactively engage to avoid harm or to reduce the
impact of harm before the necessity to invoke sanctions is activated. Where the preventive actions
do not yield desired result, the QJB may by its considered opinion (legal opinion), presented in the
form of a report, trigger other bodies (political or judicial) to apply sanction.59 This interpretation
of purpose can also be deduced from the myriad activities that QJBs are empowered to undertake
to assist states enhance implementation of treaty obligations as compared to the single activity of
ICs. The bulk of these activities relate to finding, collating and disseminating information to
different actors (courts, political actors and civil society) for use to pressure states to implement
their obligations.
Since the main accepted differences between QJBs and ICs in international human rights
exist more in degree than anything else, recognizing purpose for establishment as a separate
distinction potentially avoids a conflation of roles. Thus, it can be ventured that a QJB is a body
of independent experts authorized to undertake a range of juridical and non-judicial activities
aimed at managing information to enhance state implementation of international obligations. This
is the working definition on which the rest of this paper advances. In this role, the focus is not on
the power to bind states, but more on the ability of the Committee to attract the cooperation of
states in the management of information.
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. This interpretation is supported by a reading of the Travaux Preparatoire of the European Commission and the
records of the early meetings of the OAS leading to the establishment of the Inter-American Commission.
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III. SOCIALIZING STATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: A JOB FOR THE COURTS?
Treaty supervisory mechanisms are useful when they help steer state behaviour towards respect
for international obligations. Shaping state behaviour occurs through a process of socialization by
regime actors, including international judicial and non-judicial bodies.60 Thus, the most effective
human rights regimes have to be those that successfully cause states to implement their obligations.
Does conceptualizing the African Children’s Committee as a non-judicial actor reduce its potential
to socialize states?
Proponents of the view that international law matters in shaping state conduct generally
consider coercion and persuasion as two key ways in which this occurs. 61 These concepts also
represent two leading theoretical approaches to explaining compliance in international law.
According to the enforcement approach, states are more likely to implement their international
obligations when a mechanism comparable to the coercive apparatus in national legal systems
looms to be applied in the event of violation.62 The managerial approach, takes the view that
information, guidance and assistance supplied in a ‘cooperative problem-solving’ manner will
enable states implement their international obligations without any need for coercion or threat of
coercion.63 Thus, whereas the enforcement approach conceptualizes compliance as a function of

. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “How to influence states: socialization and international human rights law”,
(2004) 54 Duke L J 621 – 703. Some scholars generally hold the view that international law hardly affect state conduct
so that any evidence of compliance can be explained as coincidence. See for instance, FA Boyle, “The irrelevance of
International Law: The schism between International law and International politics”, (1980) 10 CAL W INT’L LJ
193.
61
. Goodman & Jinks supra note 60, argue that acculturation is a third form by which socialization occurs. The analysis
in this paper applies coercion and persuasion.
62
. See Jonas Tallberg, “Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management and the European Union”, (2002) 56 Inter’l
Organizations 609 for a summary.
63
. Ibid.
60
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the threat or use of sanctions, the managerial approach views (and therefore advocates)
implementation as dependent on a regime’s ability to enhance the capacity of states through
increased ‘transparency and simplification of rules’.64
Despite the horizontal, anarchic nature of the international system, coercion and persuasion
are veritable but distinct concepts that offer alternative paths for implementation of international
human rights standards. Goodman and Dink eloquently articulate the essence of these opposing
concepts when they argue that the crux of coercion lies in the ability to ‘influence the behaviour
of ... states by escalating the benefits of conformity or the cost of non-conformity through material
rewards or punishments’.65 On the flip side, the essence of persuasion, they contend, is the capacity
to ‘influence state behaviour through processes of social learning and other forms of information
conveyance’.66 As a mechanism of socialization, coercion depends on the existence of power
relations in which the coercing entity enjoys superior power and is in a position to either confer or
withhold costs and benefits. Thus, the effectiveness of a coercive regime depends both on the value
affected states attach to regime incentives as well as on prediction of the regime’s capacity to apply
coercion when necessary. The effectiveness of persuasion on the other hand, would depend on the
provision of information valued by the affected state and the ability of the persuading entity to
convince states on the intrinsic worth of the desired action.
Regional human rights treaty bodies and activities can be categorized as either coercionoriented or persuasion-oriented. At a general level, state reporting activities can be categorized as
persuasion-oriented activities while the communications procedures come under coercion-oriented

. Steven Roper & Lilian Barria, “Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: A Test Case for Enforcement
and Managerial Theories of State Compliance”, (2011) The American Political Science Association Annual Meeting,
Seattle, WA, USA.
65
. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 60 at 633.
66
. Ibid at 365.
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activities.67 Similarly, treaty bodies can either be coercion-oriented or persuasion-oriented entities.
Lacking power to bind states but understood as a mechanism for information management, the
African Child Rights Committee falls in the category of persuasion-oriented bodies. ICs, as entities
with authority to make legally binding decisions, fall in the category of coercion-oriented bodies.
Generally, the legally-binding quality of their decisions presupposes that sanctions will follow
states’ failure to comply with orders of ICs. However, it is critical to bear in mind that ICs are not
necessarily the coercive arm of their respective regimes since they, as courts, do not have their
own means of imposing or withholding costs and benefits. That capacity often resides in the most
powerful political organs of these regimes.68 At best, ICs are bearers of the threat of sanction or
coercion since they are empowered to make the determination whether (and when) state conduct
warrants the application of coercion and to express that determination to the offending state and
the coercive arm alike.
Understanding ICs and QJBs generally as coercion-oriented and persuasion-oriented
bodies respectively, are ICs potentially more effective since they can unleash the coercive arm of
a regime on erring states? In this regard, it is important to recall that coercion ‘does not necessarily
change the preference of the actor and may be ineffective if the state considers the expected
benefits of non-conformity to exceed the costs of sanction’.69 From this perspective of cost-benefit
analysis by states, insofar as the bearer of the threat of coercion is not simultaneously the coercive
arm of the regime, the cost of non-compliance is not multiplied by increasing the number of bodies
with authority to convey the threat of sanction. Although proponents of more judicial-acting role
for QJBs would argue that the moral weight on recalcitrant states is heavier when more
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. However, it will be argued infra that the communications procedure can be persuasion-oriented when undertaken
by QJBs.
68
. Usually plenary bodies of Ministers and Heads of Governments.
69
. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 60 at 633.
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international bodies find a state in violation, there is no evidence that the moral weight of a nonbinding decision is lesser than that of a legally binding decision.70 Thus, the argument that the cost
of non-compliance is not raised by an increase in the number of threat-bearers is both a justification
for keeping the roles of QJBs and ICs distinct as it is a claim that the African Child Rights
Committee will not necessarily become more effective if its communications procedure is more
powerful or its decisions are termed binding.
Further analysis of the comparative advantage of ICs can be made on the basis of a modest
evaluation of the benefits deliverable by human rights courts. Murray and Mottershaw identify
three expectations that human rights communities have of adjudicatory processes. 71 First, there is
expectation that the decisions will ‘offer redress to victims of human rights’. Second, decisions are
supposed to ‘prevent future violations’. Third, ‘a better understanding of the content and
obligations in question’ should emanate as a consequence of adjudication. Without suggesting that
they are exhaustive, these expectations provide a basis for evaluating comparative worth of ICs.
As institutions for enforcing compliance with international law,72 ICs commonly order
redress for victims of rights violation. However, it is debatable whether the threat of sanction
significantly influences states’ decisions to redress victims as ordered by ICs. Apart from the fact
that states are unlikely to impose sanctions on other states for each failure to redress individual
victims, human rights regimes generally lack incentives sufficient to coerce states to comply with
IC orders.73 Thus, the mere fact that decisions are legally binding and assure or invite the
application of coercion does not significantly make human rights regimes more effective.

Botswana’s assertion that it is not obliged to comply with the African Commission’s decision in Good v Botswana
denies the existence of a legal obligation but does not affect the moral obligation on that state to comply with its
international obligation.
71
Murray & Mottershaw, supra note 31 at 350.
72
Shelton supra note 6 at 542.
73
. Regimes linked to economic integration communities are obvious exceptions.
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The best evidence that ICs guarantee redress for individual victims of human rights
violations comes from the European and Inter-American human rights systems. Accordingly, the
pressure on QJBs to imitate ICs has arguably been influenced by the perception that the
effectiveness of those systems largely depends on the competence of their courts to make legally
binding decisions. For instance, Udombana asserts that ‘increasing knowledge in Africa of the
experiences and successes of the Inter-American and European courts of human rights’ has been
an impetus for the establishment of an African human rights court.74 In his view, ‘unlike the
regional human rights commissions, state governments almost universally respect judicial orders
of the regional human rights courts’.75 Similarly, Sarkin offers a variety of commentaries on the
European system as evidence that the effectiveness of a human rights regime is assured when states
comply with legally binding decisions of ICs.76
While the relative effectiveness of these systems is undisputed, the link between
compliance and the mere qualification of decisions as binding is contestable. Treaties are binding
on parties yet states occasionally violate treaty obligations. State practice also shows that a number
of bilateral and multilateral commitments are essentially gentlemen’s agreement yet that fact alone
has not prevented states from respecting obligations based on such agreements that lack legally
binding quality. The UN human rights system also provides compelling evidence that a human
rights system can attract respect from state even when the decisions of its monitoring mechanisms
lack binding legal quality. Despite its shortcomings, the UN system continues to provide leadership
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. Ndombana, supra note 9 at 78.
. Ibid. Also see Viljoen, supra note 22 at 14 on the expectation that legally binding decisions will enhance
effectiveness of the system.
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. Sarkin, supra note 31 at 288 – 289. Sarkin cites Buergenthal and Shelton who found that ‘the decisions of the
European Court are routinely complied with by European Governments. He also refers to Beach (2003) for the claim
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of the European Court of Human Rights’. However, Sarkin does not conclude that the African human rights system
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in human rights such that it also passes as an effective international human rights regime. 77 Thus,
supposedly non-binding decisions are potentially viable means of socialization without any threat
of coercion, insofar as target states are persuaded of their worth.
Absent a causal relationship between the legally-binding quality of decisions and the rate
of state compliance, it is difficult to attribute effectiveness of those human rights systems merely
to the bindingness of the decisions. In fact, scholars assert that regional human rights courts also
face challenges of non-compliance particularly from states experiencing domestic democratic
challenges.78 Scholars also argue convincingly that other factors contribute to the effectiveness of
human rights regimes.79 This challenges the assumption that states will redress violations
immediately an IC authorized to make binding decisions makes a pronouncement. While ICs do
order relief for violation of rights, states do not always implement such orders and the binding
quality of decisions does not always trigger implementation.
Whether the legal quality of decisions and the threat of sanctions borne by ICs influence
domestic efforts to prevent future violations is also highly debatable. Future violations are avoided
when offending national laws are brought in line with international standards and state officials
alter their rights-violating conducts. In theory, ICs can undertake international constitutional
review functions and exercise authority to rule that national laws are in ‘conflict with higher order
obligations’.80 However, practice shows that ICs may flag affected national laws as being
inconsistent with international standards but are generally not empowered to strike down such laws
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. For instance, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights remains one of the most prestigious human rights roles
in the globe.
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. See Murray & Mottershaw, supra note 33 for example.
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. Ibid.
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. Karen Alter, 'The multiple roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Resolution,
Constitutional and Administrative Review' in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds, Interdisciplinary Perspectives
on International Law and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 345 - 370
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in the same way national constitutional courts would do.81 Further, states enjoy discretion in
relation to amendment of national laws according to national legislative practices and this is not
affected by the bindingness or otherwise (legal quality) of the decision that has flagged the
inconsistency. Thus, the coercive force of a human rights regime is generally not applied to compel
amendment of national laws. State officials are also not threatened by the jurisdiction of regional
human rights courts so that conviction that rights are intrinsically valuable rather than fear of
sanction would best explain any change of conduct on their part. The fact-specific and narrow
contextual nature of adjudicatory procedure further restricts the potential for preventing future
violations since ICs are unlikely to capture all foreseeable scenarios of possible violations in the
context of a given case. Moreover, complaints of repeat-violations in the European human rights
system demonstrates that even the most respected courts have not successfully prevented future
violations. Thus, while ICs may occasionally influence states to avoid future violations, this is not
necessarily because they bear the threat of sanction or have competence to make binding decisions.
As regards the capacity to enhance understanding of the content of rights treaties, while the
institutional authority of courts might be influential in legal systems based on judicial precedence,
this is not necessarily the case in international adjudicatory practice. Generally, decisions in
international litigation only bind parties to the specific case even though increasingly reference to
earlier jurisprudence is becoming common in international adjudicatory practice. However, such
reference to earlier case-law is more attributable to a combination of institutional and intellectual
authority of the earlier adjudicator(s) than merely to the binding quality of the decision. 82 For
instance, in both the African and Inter-American systems, elucidation of rights by regional
commissions has consistently shaped the contents of treaties despite the fact that the decisions of
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. The practice of the ECtHR best exemplifies this.
. This is reinforced by the fact that qualification for appointment into ICs and QJBs are not materially different.
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these commissions lack binding legal quality. The African experience even shows that the African
Commission has so far contributed more to development of content-understanding of the African
Charter than any other institution. In other words, human rights communities are persuaded rather
than coerced into accepting the authority of interpretation made by treaty supervisory bodies.
Hence, it is difficult to sustain a claim that ICs are more likely to enhance better understanding of
the contents of human rights treaties. It is also not possible to convincingly argue that the
Committee’s decision will be more authoritative if it acts like an IC.
Even where the legal quality of decisions makes significant difference in delivering on
community expectations, a number of other practical challenges could restrict that significance.
Under some national constitutions, international law (including decisions of ICs) does not enjoy
immediate and direct force of law in the domestic legal system.83 In such legal systems, judicial
actors jealously protective of domestic judicial authority are more likely to be resistant to any
‘foreign’ judicial decision that purports to usurp domestic judicial authority. The silent power
tussle that is likely to ensure potentially creates difficulty in cases where national judiciaries have
a role to play in the implementation of international decisions. Resistance may also prevent
national judiciaries from acknowledging any interpretation of rights, perceiving international caselaw as a threat rather than as ‘additional material to support judicial law making at the national
level’.84 Specific to the rights of children, perception that binding decisions potentially alter the
power relations at the domestic level may also affect the reception of international decisions at the
national level.
Overall, direct and proxy evidence from international adjudicatory practice does not
support any claim that competence to make legally binding decision (with its attendant conveyance
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. Martin & Simmons, supra note 8 at 749.
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of the threat of coercion) makes ICs better mechanisms for rights protection. Instead, there is basis
to argue that ICs do not cover the field of state socialization in human rights. Although, there is
also insufficient evidence to conclude that QJBs are more effective institutions, situations exist in
which the absence of a sense of compulsion is more likely to secure implementation. Thus,
acknowledging the weakness of overreliance on coercion invites regimes to combine coercionoriented and persuasion-oriented mechanisms without pressurizing the one to imitate the other.
Experiences from the African and Inter-American human rights systems show that QJBs
are equally potent agents of socialization. Both the African Commission and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights have been relatively successful in attracting state cooperation in
their respective work. While some may argue that regional QJBs became more effective only as
they gravitated towards imitating ICs by asserting more authority for their decisions, such claims
arguably both exaggerate the socializing influence of legal nomenclature and undermine the
persuasive socializing capacity of intellectual authority. Decisions are not binding just because
they are termed binding either by treaty or by institutions but because states pledge to comply with
those decisions upon pain of sanction imposable by the collective. Practice shows that threat of
sanctions does not even always coerce states into compliance. It is also apparent that the
pronouncements of international non-judicial bodies become increasingly authoritative when the
community of users recognize their expertise in the given area. 85 Thus, absent states’ pledge to
comply with its decision upon pain of sanctions, the African Child Rights Committee (the
Committee) gains no additional value by asserting that its decisions are binding or that it has the
powers that ICs have.
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The work of bodies like The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is an
example in this regard.
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Instead, its value lies in maintaining itself as an alternative path to implementation of its
founding treaty and growing its intellectual authority on child right issues. Recognizing its distinct
identity and purpose allows the Committee to focus on strengthening its tools of persuasion
through improved information management. Accordingly, mimicking ICs arguably alters the
Committee’s identity and denies the African human rights system the benefit that ought to accrue
from having both coercion-oriented and persuasion-oriented mechanisms to monitor
implementation of the African Children Charter. With the African Court of Human and Peoples
Rights performing the system’s coercive-oriented functions, allowing the African Child Rights
Committee to retain and develop its quasi-judicial features has to be more useful to the system.

IV. THE COMMITTEE: GOING FROM BAD COPY TO BUDDING ORIGINAL
Once it is agreed that purpose should distinguish and drive the work of the African Child Rights
Committee, the challenge shifts to considering how this can shape the way the Committee
approaches its assignments. The need to avoid duplication of functions assigned to ICs and to
reduce the ‘anxiety of influence’86 that the Committee faces in trying to emulate the African
Commission’s self-transformation must inspire the reconstruction of the alternative framework on
which the Committee can perform useful functions and be evaluated on its own terms. QJBs in the
UN human rights system provide a snap-shot in this regard. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
has asserted, they ‘stand at the heart of the international human rights protection system as engines
translating universal norms into social justice and individual well-being’ because the system
‘provides authoritative guidance on human rights standards, advises on how treaties apply in

Generally see H Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), arguing that the
primary challenge rising poets take on is to do better than more established poets.
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specific cases and informs state parties of what they must do to ensure that all people enjoy their
human rights’.87 The Committee can achieve similar results without necessarily transforming into
a different institution insofar as it is able to reframe its activities around its purpose as a mechanism
for persuading implementation through effective information management. Some of the ways in
which this can be done are discussed below:
A. THE COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE AS A TOOL FOR NORM
CLARIFICATION; ADVICE ON THE APPLICABILITY OF NORM TO FACTS; AND
COLLATION OF INFORMATION GENERALLY
Although it may not be the Committee’s most impactful activity yet, the communications
procedure is arguably the most celebrated and anticipated innovation that the African Children
Charter has introduced.88 Under the traditional framework, this procedure is still very weak and
underdeveloped even as its usage has been extremely limited.89 Perceived as a mechanism to
condemn states for violations of children’s rights and to pronounce redress for individual victim(s),
the communications procedure is adversarial and expected to culminate in binding decisions. In
this perspective, the Committee is a detached umpire wielding the hammer of the regime to judge
recalcitrant states that are expected to feel obligated to comply with relevant orders when found in
violation.90 A consequence of this framework is that in order to avoid liability before the
Committee a state has to switch on a defensive rather than a cooperative mode in reaction to the
communications procedure.
As a persuasion-oriented body for information management, the objective of the
Committee’s communications procedure would be to enhance state capacity to implement Charter. Cited by Aslan Abashidze, “The process of strengthening the human rights treaty body system” in AJ Belohlavek,
N Rozehnalova and F Cerny eds, The role of governmental and non-governmental organizations in the 21st Century (
New York: Juris Publishing, 2014) 4.
88
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89
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obligations by assisting them with norm clarification, advice on the applicability of norms to
specific factual contexts as well as collation and dissemination of relevant information. This
objective relates to the idea that states resort to international bodies when their domestic
institutions fail to address issues of concern.91 Failure on the part of national institutions can be
attributed either to inability or unwillingness. Where failure is a result of unwillingness to
implement a state’s international obligations, cooperation might not be forth-coming and coercion
(if effective in that regime) becomes the more appropriate option.92 However, where the failure of
national institutions arises from inability –unfamiliarity with the nature and scope of treaty
obligations, difficulty in determining whether particular facts invite application of international
norms or plain lack of capacity to determine the nature of appropriate remedy - the state is likely
to be more cooperative and willing to assist the Committee find a suitable resolution of the alleged
violation. Thus, where national institutions fail because they truly lack capacity, the Committee’s
role as a body of independent expert is more useful when it persuades state actors (including
national courts) to accept a best possible approach to implementation. In that situation, the
Committee’s conclusion on any communication takes the form of an authoritative legal opinion93
that becomes stimulus for implementation and reduces resistance from the state and its actors,
including the courts. Such an approach does not rely either on the legal quality of the Committee’s
decision nor on the regime’s threat of coercion for socialization of the state. In any case, the actual
link between these and state compliance is yet to be established.94
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Martin & Simmons, supra note 7 at 752. This point is exemplified by the principle of exhaustion of local remedies
which allows national institutions to first attempt to remedy alleged violations.
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In such cases, regimes that rely on national judiciaries for enforcement will find resistance from those institutions.
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The difference between an IC’s approach and a QJB’s approach to the communications
procedure should determine how the Committee is evaluated and whether it is a bad copy or an
original actor. As coercion-oriented mechanisms, ICs are bearers of their regime’s threat of
sanction and convey that threat to a violating state in applying the relevant treaty. As international
law enforcers ICs determine whether a violation has occurred, sanctions are applicable on the given
facts and whether the state violator should be the target of those sanctions. The IC temporarily
transfers the regime’s threat and weight of sanction to the aid of the wining litigant and orders the
state to act or refrain from acting in a certain way at the risk of those sanctions. In legal parlance,
the IC makes a mandatory order to apply the relevant treaty. In contradistinction, the Committee
as a persuasion-oriented mechanism is essentially a conveyor of information. Unlike courts, the
Committee has wide mandate to gather relevant information regarding a given compliant, either
independently or with cooperation from the parties to a communication. Like ICs, the Committee
can interpret the norms vis-à-vis the given facts to determine whether a violation has occurred. It
then takes a different path by conveying that information to the state in the form of a declaration
of authoritative legal opinion instead of an order.95 If it considers that the facts amount to a
violation, the Committee would advise the state on how to rectify the situation and bring itself into
compliance. In legal parlance, only a declaration is made and the state retains the discretion as to
how to proceed. This approach does not prevent the Committee from ‘protecting’ rights as the
entire process aims at persuading the state (and its actors) to ‘voluntarily’ change conduct and
bring itself in line with its international obligations. Critically, under this conceptualisation,
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. Where an international court lacks human rights jurisdiction but still hears a case involving human rights, its actions
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assessment of the Committee’s effectiveness cannot – in the main – be on the basis of the rate of
state compliance with its decisions, but on the value of information that it is able to collate and
disseminate regarding violations of children’s rights.
B. STATE REPORTING FOR INFORMATION GATHERING AND CONSTRUCTIVE
DIALOGUE
State reporting is not a function of ICs but constitutes one of the main pillars of the ‘promotional’
mandate of QJBs such as the Committee.96 Originally, the state reporting procedure generally aims
at promoting constructive dialogue between a supervisory mechanism and the reporting state to
enhance the capacity of states to fulfil their treaty obligations.97 Increasingly bowing to pressure
to transform into more powerful, therefore coercive-oriented bodies, QJBs are taking an arguably
more confrontational approach to state reporting, sometimes employing it as a tool for enhancing
state compliance with decisions made in the communications procedure.98 Either as a consequence
or a trigger of this change of direction, default in state reporting obligations and withholding of
relevant information from reports submitted have also become quite common even in relation to
the Committee.99
In a reconstructed framework, the state reporting procedure of the Committee would have
to focus on strengthening constructive dialogue but also aim at collation and dissemination of
quality information. In this regard, the Committee’s effort would be directed at assisting reporting
states with constructive recommendations aimed at enhancing capacity to fulfil treaty obligations
rather than creating a perception that reporting is for assessment purposes. Additionally,
information from state reports would have to be managed and disseminated in ways that provide
. African Children’s Charter, supra note 1, art 43.
. In respect of the UN CRC, see Rebecca Rios-Kohn, “The Convention on the Rights of Children” (1997-98) 5 Geo
J. on Fighting Poverty 139- 149.
98
. For instance, Viljoen (2012) 349 shows that state reporting is now ‘aimed at assessing’ state adherence to treaty
obligations. However, see Viljoen’s discussion of the aims of state reporting at 350.
99
. See Abashidze, supra note 87 at 7 on challenges associated with state reporting procedure of QJBs.
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other state parties critical comparative information regarding how treaty obligations are engaged
by all state parties, creating room for collective search for means of addressing similar challenges.

V. CONCLUSION
Twenty five years after it was established by treaty and fourteen years after it was first inaugurated,
the African Child Rights Committee continues to battle for recognition even within its immediate
constituency –the African human rights system. Without significant powers similar to those of the
African Court on Human and Peoples Rights and having yet to self-transform into a more powerful
entity in the manner that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is believed to
have done, the Committee remains the proverbial less fortunate cousin. This article has argued that
the pressure to self-transform to become (or at least appear) more powerful like ICs has led to
something akin to anxiety of influence and threatens the quasi-judicial identity and character of
this Committee. The article has argued that the pressure plays out in passive and active forms either
when the Committee is ignored or assessed as ineffective by the human rights community. Taking
the view that the pressure results from using/adapting the framework for assessment of ICs to QJBs
such as the Committee, this article has also proposed a reconsideration of the distinction between
ICs and QJBs, arguing that purpose is an important element of that distinction. This article
concludes that if purpose is taken into consideration, a different evaluation framework should be
used for assessing the work of QJBs such as the Committee. In such a reconstructed framework,
the Committee will not only find its own original functions and therefore become more useful to
the system but will attract more positive assessment that will eventually lead to elimination of the
pressure to transform.
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